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1. Introduction
While there is a tendency in Guatemala to associate the term "ethnic" with
"Indian" or "indigenous," in fact, such a usage is misleading. If we seek a synonym for
"ethnic," the nearest we could come would be "identity." In Guatemala, not only Mayan
Indians, but ladinos, Garifunas, and gringos are ethnicities.
Cultural differences alone do not constitute ethnic differences; the former can
exist without signaling or identifying the lanero Cultural differences become significant
ethnically when ahuman population decides that they are critical to its identification and
therefore must be preserved and reproduced.
For the moment, let us define an ethnic group, or ethnicity, as a population
whose members define their collective survival in terms of replicating a shared identity,
through socia11ydefined biological reproduction.
An individual's "identity" is substantially a psychological phenomenon; it lies
within the nervous system. As a consequence, one of the problems that ethnicities have
(shared by those who study them) is how to identify themselves sociologically. That is,
simply because members of an aggregate share an identity does not indicate where or
how they will fit into a recognizable and predictable niche in a larger society. This is
critical, because an individual's identity cannot have social evolutionary significance
unless it is reproduced socially (Le., unless it becomes part of the society). Hence, to be
significant in social evolution, an ethnic identity has to reproduce itself; to do this, it has
to fmd a sociological niche.
This paper examines how some of the major Central American ethnicities found
their sociological niches and asks what the histories of these particular ethnicities tell us
about ethnicities in general and, therefore, about their future.
The first part will review three processes through which ethnicities have come
into being-by conquest, by acting as brokers between different states, and by acting as
brokers within a state-and will deal with cases from various parts of Central America
in order to emphasize that all peoples who are socially significant are, in fact, ethnicities.
In the second part, I want to demonstrate how an understanding of the histories of these
cases makes it c1ear that most of us are members of ethnicities, and that that membership
makes us think in certain ways.
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2. The Emergence of Ethnicities in Central America
If we want to understand ethnic groups, we must see them as historical events
and understand their historical antecedents. The following will seek to underline the
circumstances of the emergence of some of the principal ethnicities of the region. The
context in all instances is that of the expanding state, and the effort is, therefore, to fmd
consistencies in the diverse relationships that have arisen as a result.
A. Conqueror, Conquered, and Unconquered
The meeting of the Old World and the New almost irnmediately created one
major ethnicity, the "Indian," and probably contributed to the consolidation of another,
the "Spanish." The encounters, however, were spread over many centuries with the
result that some quite different kinds of relations emerged.
It is convenient to distinguish three kinds of survivors of the conquest era. There
were the conquerors, the Spanish and their mestizo and, occasionally, Indian associates,
who retained socioeconomic dominance thorough continued control of military might.
There were the conquered, the politically and economically subordinated indigenous
peoples, who were gradually harnessed into systems of forced labor for the benefit of
the colonial rulers. In this category, for general purposes, may be inc1uded the slaves
brought from Africa to supplement the rapid1y declining indigenous peoples. And there
were the unconquered, those indigenous peoples against whom the Spanish were unable
to mount effective expeditions and who effectively resisted the attempts to evangelize
them. In Central America these three kinds of societies have quite distinctive geographi-
cal distributions and differ in their subsequent histories.
Almost everywhere the Spanish and their mestizo successors went, they
eventually conquered. In the broad picture, the conquests, sociomilitary and cuItural,
coupled with the epidemics of diseases they entailed, effectively eliminated most of the
indigenous population by the mid-seventeenth century. Beginning at this time,
especially in areas of pre-Columbian complex societies, the conquered survived in
sufficient numbers to begin to reassert themselves biologica11y.In Mesoamerica, where
high cuItures, state, and hierarchical society had allowed the growth of a very large and
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well-organized pre-Columbian population, there were more survivors and they were
more directIy hamessed to the political-economic controls of the colonial state. There the
conquered and the conquerors lived together in a tense relationship of dependency and
control. There were regions of considerably greater Spanish control, such as the "core
area" identified by Lutz and Lovell.1
There are different ways to contrast the areas of dense exploited populations and
those where few Indians remained and where the contemporary lowland horticultural or
collecting societies have only gradually been brought within the orbit of the state. Jean
Jackson, referring to Colombia, sees the difference in terms of clearly marked highland-
lowland differences.2 David Maybury-Lewis sees the difference in terms of whether the
Indians did or did not serve as labor.3 I would suspect, however, that the question of
conquest generated these other differences, although the highland-Iowland difference
clearly implies an ecological template.
Surely the two most important ethnicities created by the conquest were the
Spanish and the Indian. It is not clear just when the term "Spaniard" became current, but
it was in regular use in the eighteenth-century Mexican literature. A nationalizing
identity, fairly early for Europe, seems to have developed with the appearance of
peninsular people in the New World, stemming possibly in part from the sense of
national mission and identity of the Castilians. It was they who felt the elite position
provided by the papal concordat that granted them special control over the church. The
Aragonese were explicitIy excluded from the New World advantages provided to the
Castilians, and other peripheral peoples, such as the Catalans and Portuguese, deeply
resented their exclusion. It seems to be the case that the New World was a real catalyst
for the emergence of Spanish nationhood.4 It is also possible that Charles V's and
Phillip II's Low Country wars may have provided a further contrast between "Spain,"
and the emerging northern European nationalities.
The "Indian" was, of course, a totally European invention, an erroneously
applied externallabel. While important aboriginal ethnicities were already present in
Mesoamerica and the Andes, the decimation of the indigenous population made separate
identities less and less convenient and significant to a Spanish king whose overriding
interest was the yield in wealth and numbers of tributaries, not the diverse languages
they spoke. For their part, the New World populations found no basis for common
identity. The label "Indian" continues today to reflect the external definition, and now
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that New World aboriginal peoples are seeking some common hemispheric identity, the
tenn has been discarded.5
The Mesoamerican ethnic relations that have evolved in the subsequent four
centuries have been marked by irregular, but continuing, economic and political
subordination, periodic rebellions, and often terror-ridden reprisals. I am elsewhere
arguing that contemporary Guatemala and El Salvador have inherited an ethnic relational
system that involved a deep sense of apprehension and distrust between the two great
ethnicities that compose their populations.6 Guatemala is currentIy stunned by a decade
of massacres of Indians that conservative estimates set at some 50,000 deaths. At the
same time, it appears that the Salvadoran Indians, possibly as many as 500,000 people,
are self-defined but not generally recognized by outsiders. Salvadoran ladinos are
genera11y satísfied that the Indians disappeared after the 1932 matanza (during which
over 10,000 Indians were slaughtered). This is not an entirely unreasonable conclusion,
since the Indians themselves realized that self-survival (and, by definition, therefore, the
survival of the ethnicity) required playing down overt cultural markers and becoming
ethnica11yclandestine.7 Thus the conquerors in Mesoamerica still respond violentIy to
cha11engesfrom the population that was supposed to have been conquered four hundred
years ago.
In contrast, ethnic relations are entirely different in southeastem Central
America-the region east of a line running from the northem border of Guatemala and
Honduras to the head of the Gulf of Nicoya in Costa Rica. The principal surviving
indigenous ethnicities in this region (e.g., the Miskito, Sumu, Talamanca, Guaymí,
Kuna, and Chocó) are a11peoples who were hever conquered. While they have been
politica11y,and often economically, subordinated, the relationship long since established
with thc Spani~h and their descendants has been one of negotiation and coexistence. The
mestizos 01'Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama do not share, at least to the
same extent, the latent anxiety about a potential rebellion of indigenous people that
seems covertly to pervade the ladinos of Guatemala and El Salvador. The Tule rebellion
in Panama in 1925 and the confrontations of 1980to 1988with the Miskitos in Nicaragua
were handled through negotiation, not through military reprisals. Honduran relations
with the Garifunas of the Atlantic coast have been basically benign and often mutually
usefu!' In short, where conquest was not the fundamental basis of the relationship,
history has been considerably less offensive, less tainted by fear and terror.
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B. Interstate Brokers and Allies
The state also affects ethnic relations in ways that are not directIy
confrontational. It sets into motion conditions that may create a social vacuum into
which an ethnicity steps to create a new roleo
The colonial and republican eras found gaps in the relations between the major
powers-between Spain and Great Britain and, later, between the Central American
countries and the United States.8 Where indigenous groups had been contacted, and
often displaced by Spanish colonial development, they found reason to identify
separately in order to deal more effectively with the great powers. Perhaps best known
because of their contemporary role are the Miskitos of Nicaragua and Honduras; the
Kunas of Pan ama, however, also played a similar roleo A1though quite different in
origin and in the manner of their taking on the intermediary role, the Garifunas also
found an important adaptive niche between the British and the Spanish colonials.
MISKITO.The social forebears of the modero Miskitos were one of a number of
major Indian societies inhabiting the Atlantic coastal region of Nicaragua and
Honduras.9 They emerged in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century documents as they
were becoming distinguished by their Africanization, which evidently began in mid-
seventeenth century. The most cornmon reference was to "zambos" and "miskitos,"
sometimes singly and sometimes running the two terms together. ApparentIy, from
early contact, they easily incorporated strangers into the population. Blacks were
arriving on the Miskito coast, possibly beginning with an early shipwreck of slaves, but
more substantially from a mixture with slaves brought to the frontier enterprises
established by British planters from the West Indies.
The Miskitos also early established friendly relations with the English who used
the coast for victualizing their ships. They gradually became allies in the continuing
conflict between the English and the Spanish. Their separate identification emerged as
they became the warlike traders who enslaved their aboriginal neighbors, especially the
Sumus, to provide the English with Indian chattel, and became a standing scourge to the
Spanish colonists.
The Miskito identification must have taken on meaning for the Spanish over the
same period as the open hostility between the two groups became ever more
pronounced. The colonial Miskitos then spread both nonh and south in their ever more
successful predatory expeditions and became a recognized ethnicity from Panama to
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Belize. Their polítical hegemony over the region lasted well into the eighteenth century.
The term "Spanish" is still applied by the Miskito to mestizo Nicaraguans.
As the British gave up their military and slaving connections with the Miskitos,
and as the Spanish abandoned the Spanish Main, the Miskitos' aggressive hegemony
was seriously weakened. A political vacuum emerged among the new republics on the
isthmus and the British and French Caribbean colonies and the emerging power of the
United States to the north. The English-speaking Creoles, having themselves come from
the islands, had better connections with those centers. As the extraisthmian relations
became more peaceful, the Creoles increasingly mediated for the British economic and
commercial interests in the area, thereby displacing the more warlike Miskitos. The
Creoles therefore found it necessary to differentiate themselves and to politicalIy
displace the Miskitos entirely as the Miskito kings became increasingly Creolized; they
were often educated in Jamaica and returned with admiration for and dependency upon
the Caribbean network. Expanding U.S. interests also found the Creole population
useful and helped to marginalize the Miskitos by ridiculing them as primitive boobies
who had been tricked by the British into serving as convenient allies.lO
KUNA. The Kunas, similar to the Miskitos, occupied an interface between
Spanish and English and succeeded, by moving from the mainland to the islands of the
San BIas Archipdago, in retaining a high degree of autonomy from the Colombian state
as it emerged in the nineteenth century.ll This interstitial character was, perhaps,
somewhat residual when it served them best, but it thrust them into the role of one of the
most siglÚfÍcantlndian ethnicities in Central America.
When Panama gained independence, early in the twentieth century, the new state
tried to bring the Kunas under its sovereignty; it specifically sought to educate Kuna
youth as Panamanians, to install Panamanian police in the San BIas Kuna archipelago,
and to impose changes in various local customs-in short, to convert them into
"modern" Panarnanians. In 1925, the Kuna reacted and in a carefulIy staged rebellion-
the Tule rebellion-calculatedly assassinated some thirty policemen, Panamanian
citizens, and acclllturated Indians resident on the islands. The United States still held
extensive control over the affairs of the Panamanian government and evidently decided
that it would be better to have a peaceful autonomous Indian population along the coast
to the east of the newly constructed canal than to buttress the strength of the Panamanian
state. It therefore entered as a broker and the Panamanian government negotiated a
solution in which the foundation for the San BIas Comarca reservation was established.
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The fact that the Panarnanian state was weak militarily doubtless contributed to
the solution. The U.S. role, however, while c1early self-interested, did in fact contribute
to a benign solution to a potentially bloody ethnic conflicto What is particularly
impressive is that since World War 11,the Panarnanian government has continued the
relationship. Given the nature of Indian-state relations elsewhere, the conduct of the
Panamanian government must be recognized as quite commendable, if atypical of the
reglOn.
In recent years the Panamanian military has been increasingly active in the
archipelago, and reactive organizations have emerged arnong the Kuna.12 A recent news
report states that the government tried to manipulate an elder chief in contravention of
the interests of younger Kuna leaders. The latter indicated their distaste by running up
an American flag, and Kuna students pushed some unarmed soldiers off a patrol boat.13
In comparison with what one would expect the reaction to be in Guatemala or El
Salvador, the tolerance of the Panarnanian state continues to be remarkable.
GARIFUNA. The people known through most of the past two centuries as the
"Black Caribs" carne into being in the Lesser Antilles when they becarne differentiated
from the resident Indian population, possibly through intermixture with Africans, but
more likely because they were rebellious. After considerable strife, the British rounded
up most of them and transhipped them to Roatan, one of the Bay Islands of Honduras,
whence they rapidly spread along much of the north shore of the mainland. While
surviving in the greatest numbers in Honduras, they are a very significant population in
Belize and extend as far south as the central Nicaraguan coast.
The self-identity of the Black Caribs was certainly established by the time of
their arrival in Honduras. What is interesting is that their interstitial role between the
English and the Spanish was the reverse of that played by the Miskitos. Whereas the
latter sided with the English, the Garifuna were accepted by the Spanish in Honduras
because they were renowned as warriors hostile to the English and could serve as a
buffer between the highland-dwelling Spanish and the English scourge along the coasts.
The Black Caribs were c1early coastal dwellers and refused to be pushed into agrarian
activities.
As the need for warriors dec1ined and agrocommercial interests began to spring
up along the coast, the Black Caribs found many kinds of occupations in the towns and
loading docks and extended their migrating tendencies to the point of being contracted as
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labor in distant places (they cut wood in Scotland during the World War II), but also in
the Caribbean Islands and the United States.
"Garifuna" was taken on as an identifying label after 1950, perhaps as late as
1980.14One explanation is that as an obviously colonialist-racist term, "Black Carib"
was increasingly denigTating for a people who were visiting and taking up residence
elsewhere in the world--especially in the United States, where being a "black"
creates immedíate problems. In any event, the new label has been accompanied by the
creatíon of a dance group and a solidarity group, the Organización Fraterna Negra de
Honduras (OFRANEH), which works on community development and issues a
monthlypublication,El Garifuna.15
C. Intrastate Brokers
The cases discussed so far have been indigenous ethnicities that found their self-
definition enhanced through playing roles that served the purposes of states relatíng
themselves to other states. Interface roles, however, also exist within states where the
internal evolution of a society exposes a need for articulation with no ímmediate
candidate available to satisfy it. This seems to have been the case in the appearance of
the ladinos in middle-level positions in eighteenth-century highland Guatemala, and of
the Anglophone Creoles on the Atlantic coast in the same era. Today the increasing
education of the indigenous population in Mesoamerica, coupled with its economic
expansion, calls for political intermediaries to deal with the various arms of the state and
ladino society. There is c1early an indigenous Mayan middle, or bourgeois, c1ass
emerging. While small in numbers, it is finding an important role in reprcsentíng the
rising national identification of the native population.
CREOLES.16 The generic meaning ofthe term "Creole" was a person bom in the
New World 01'European parents. Cognate terms were commonly used in Spanish and
French. lt emerged as an ethnic label for black Anglophone coastal peoples after Britain
ceded the Atlantic coast to Spain with the treaty of 1783, and was applíed to other
English-speaking mixed bloods from British Antilles who joined them. In the early
nineteenth century the term was used over much of the Caribbean.
The English language was a major identifying feature of this group, as was its tie
with Anglo-Caribbean English antecedents. As a black, English-speaking population in
the Miskito area, there was early mixture with the local Miskito Indians, a1though it
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appears that such admixture was not necessarily so common with other Indian
populations. As was suggested above, their separate ethnic identíty began to emerge in
the late eighteenth century as a response to the polítical vacuum and the decline 01'
Miskito power after the departure of British interests.
As the nineteenth century evolved, the warrior role that had endowed the
Miskitos with polítical superiority gradually lost its salience. The U.S. interests that
took up where the British left off brought with them cultural doubts about "primitive"
Indians and preferred contact with the English-speaking Creoles. The Creoles enjoyed a
superior status on the coast only for a limited period, however. With the growth and
expansion of the inland mestizo population in the twentieth century, and the claims
being made by the Managua government, their relative dominance was gradually
displaced by that of the mestizos. This was exacerbated with the triumph of the
revolution in 1979, when the incoming Sandinista government further marginalized
them in favor of mestizos.!? The Creole ethnicity clearly retains strong identification
with other black anglophone peoples of the Caribbean, and today they confront the
problem of potentially greater integration into Nicaragua.
LADINO. The colonial period was one of continuing mestizoization, but the
records are immensely ambiguous as to how the emerging varieties of people were to be
classified. The cumbersome colonial racial categories alluded to earlier had relatively
little socioethnic reality. In Spanish American those with constancy were, in general, (1)
"Indian," (2) "Spanish," "peninsular" and/or "white," and (3) "mestizo" and/or
"ladino," and so on. While the term criollo was common until the nineteenth century, it
declined thereafter, and remains in use today mainly with groups that have African
antecedents.
Finer local and regional classifications yielded local discrimination, but did not
result in the emergence of a widespread ethnicity that was distinct from Indians and
whites. Indeed, the mestizo's goal was often to be identified and marry as a whíte; and
for urbane, peninsular officials it was easier to crudely bunch "ladinos e indios" than to
discriminate between them.
The emergence of the nineteenth-century coffee export economy had different
regional effects. Guatemala and El Salvador both became deeply involved, but the effect
was devastating in El Salvador, where the Indian land base was more severely attacked
than in Guatemala. In Guatemala, ít was easier to trap Indians into a forced labor
system, and the Reform governments of the 1870s explicitly set out to control and
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channel Indian labor into export production. Carol Smith argues that the ladinos
emerged as a separate c1ass, since they were distinguished from the Indians, that is, as
those who were to be harnessed by forced labor laws, debt peonage, and later vagrancy
laws.18They carne into the westem coffee area, principally from the oriente, to take over
the growing town commerce and to assume managerial positions in the coffee farms.
They becarne the intermediaries between the c1ass of controlled labor and the c1ass of
urban and cosmopolitan landowners and exporters. They were the conforming citizens
of the state. While Smith is probably right that the coffee era vastly enhanced the c1ass
definition of the ladinos, they were already being recognized as an emerging middle
urban c1ass by the 186Os.19
This specialized c1ass sense for the term "ladino" in the westem highlands did
not displace the more general usage of the term over the country as a whole. As such,
both the nature of the ladino society and ladino- Indian relations do vary, sometimes
profoundly, from one region to another, and the regional differences are at issue in
some of the major ethnic problems of the area. Ghidinelli asserts that on the Atlantic
coast of Honduras and Guatemala the ladinos do not so c1early self-identify. Ladinos of
the Honduran coast explicitly use the term "ladino" to refer to people of Indian-white
mixture, arnong which they count themselves, but with no sense of ethnic identity.
Ghidinelli asserts that they generally feel that it is better to be able to identify with
European extraction.20
MAYAN BOURGEOIS. In Guatemala indigenous peoples account for a very
large portion of the total population. Beginning with the Revolution of 1944, this
population has been increasingly, if irregularly, active within the scope of national
political, religious, and economic activity. There is emerging a c1early distinct, if still
small in numbers, Indian bourgeoisie that has generally completed secondary school,
and a significant number of whom have taken university studies. There are lawyers,
doctors, bureaucrats, and teachers, both at the secondary and university levels,
a1though, obviously, principally the former.
Unlike the Guatemalan highland ladinos and the Creoles of the Atlantic coast, the
Mayan bourgeoisie is creating a space for poli tical action that has become inevitable,
given the level of education available. With their basic support (if hardly luxurious)
provided for by their professional work, some of these individual s have chosen actively
to better the general political position and social welfare of the indigenous population.
Under the Ríos Montt govemment, Indians were brought into the council of state, and
12
under the current elected regime, there are two Indian deputies in Congress. While it is
generally recognized that these roles are more symbolic than functionally representative
of indigenous interests, the current deputies are nevenheless active in congressional
committees working to help their ethnic compatriots.
The emergence of indigenous identification at the nationallevel has to be seen as
one of the major ethnic events in the entire Central American region. In contrast with El
Salvador, where the comparable population has found it necessary to exist in some
obscurity for the past half century, the Indians of Guatemala have not hidden their
ethnicity, and their current national emergence can onIy suggest the growing imponance
that Indians will have in national affairs in the years to come. While the government was
able to snuff out serious Indian panicipation in the revolutionary activity of the guerrilla
groups active in the countryside (1979-1985), it is interesting that the broad mass of the
indigenous population gives no evidence of following the Salvadoran example of giving
up indigenous identification and the cultural practices that accompany it.
Since there is little evidence that the basic ladino philosophy concerning the
"indio" has changed-that natives need 10be controlled, to be educated to give up their
divergent cultural ways, and to conform to ladino-defined norms and conduct-there is
still an immense gulf in understanding of the basic principIes of ethnicities.
Nevenheless, the national-Ievel operations indicate that the day is approaching when
there will be enough native peoples at the nationallevel that they may change things in
their favor.21
The new national bourgeoisie is, therefore, increasingly playing a critical
brokerage role between the national ladino leaders and the larger mas s of Indian
peasantry, townspeople, and laborers. It is filling the space that is opening up for
indigenous leadership and, at the same time, it represents a national-Ievel viewpoint that
is sophisticated in terms of the history of the indigenous population and its role in
Guatemalan history.
3. Ethnic Dynamics
Let us now step back a moment and look again at the definition of "ethnicity."
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An ethnicity is any population whose members define their
collective survival in terms of replicating a shared identity, through
socially defined cultural and biological reproduction.
This definition implies a great deal, and we have time here only to touch on two major
areas: the importance of identity and of power.
A. Identity
Ethnicities differentiate themselves by reproducing characteristics that mark them
as distinct. The features that give the group its identity are seldom entirely knowable.
There are all sorts of subtle behaviors, some almost subliminal, that let you know when
you are dealing with a person of your own ethnicity. While some features will be made
overt and explicit, others wilJ be concealed by the members. There will also be some
that are ambiguous and may be drawn upon or not, depending on the circumstances.
Overt features are of many kinds, but most commonly they will include one or
more of the following: (1) a claim to an area of the earth's surface-land or water-Of to
a critical resource thereon; (2) a language or dialect; (3) somatic features; (4) a specific
ideologically defined social relationship, such as a religious or polítical organization; and
(5) almost always a myth of common origino
The physical nature of the feature has important consequences for both the
physical survival of the group's members and their ability to retain their ethnic
separateness and identity.22 Perhaps most critical for OOthare the retention of resources
and language. Certainly the 1110stcritical problem that European expansion pressed on
the indigenous populations of Central America (as well as on those of the rest of the
world) has been the loss of their lands. A !:,Tfeatmany romantic pages have been written
conceming the identificatjon of the Indian with the land, and certainly a great deal of it
has been true.
Less has been saicl concerning langllage, but today one of the ongoing problems
confronted by the nationally oriented Indian activists is the retention and continuation of
the Indian language. For the Mayan-language speakers this has presented serious
problems, since there are both dialectical and language differences about which final
decisions cannot be readily made.
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Sometimes the language issue presents contradictory problems. The Anglophone
Creole population of Nicaragua is divided as to whether it wants its dialect of English to
be taught in the schools. Some feel that it is an unfortunate, low-status dialect, and that
their children would benefit by being taught standard English; others feel that the local
language marks an ethnic difference that should be perpetuated.23
Much is made of somatic features by North Americans, and they are certainly
visible in Central America. However, the fact of racial mixture has attenuated severely
the identifying potential of skin color. Since it cannot identify categorically, skin color is
basically ambiguous and is used varyingly. Even though many Guatemalan highlands
indigenes do not manifest the classic "Mayan features" characteristic of the prehistoric
representations in the northem lowlands, most would be recognized as ladino were they
simply to change their identity. By the same token, many ladinos would readily be taken
for indigenes were they to take on the appropriate customs.
Perhaps the most important role that somatic features play in the ethnic system is
that, wherever people do place some emphasis on them, they influence preferences for
marital partners. This emphasis is, however, far from universal. The Miskitos are littIe
concemed, whereas the Guatemalan upper class and the North Honduras ladinos are
more concerned. Since so many ladinos are somatically indistinguishable from
indigenes, the latter could be fooled were they to depend on somatic traits as a guide.
Social relationships are, of course, the principallocus of ethnic identity. To be a
"natural" in Guatemala is to belong to a particular family, a particular village, a particular
set of religious organizations, and so on. To be a ladino is similarly to belong to a series
of relational systems that are not usually to be confused with those of the indigenous
population. All symbolic features exist, necessarily, in a network of common
understandings that also define a social relational network.
For longstanding ethnicities, such as the indigenous people of Guatemala, the
origin stories are told and retold. However, there is little question that the growing
interest manifested by educated indigenes in the traditionalliterary forms, such as the
Popol Vuh, marks a serious new effort to strengthen interest in the younger generation.
Little attention has been paid to the "origin myths " of the ladinos, but they merit serious
attention.
One of the interesting features of ladinos is that they generally recogníze that they
have some Indian genetic ancestry, but, at the same time, many prefer to reject the
notion that they have any Indian cultural heritage. The open ambiguity in this situation
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suggests that a good deal more attention needs to be paid to the question of the problem
of the ladino's identity. While there are some sophisticates who see no reason to deny
indigenous cultural and biological heritage, there are others who prefer to hide, even
deny, it.
There is another aspect of the definition of what constitutes ethnic identity and
membership that has been the source of a great deal of misunderstanding. The problem
lies in the fact that all ethnicities have at least two distinct definitions. At the very
minimum, ethnicities can be and are identified by the members themselves (Le.,
interna1ly defmed identification) and by outsiders (Le., externally defined identification).
There are, moreover, major differences between internal and external definitions,
and profound consequences deriving therefrom. Outsiders will choose criteria and
definitions that will best meet their interests. Thus, when the Spanish decided to define
the aboriginal population as human beings who could be evangelized, it enabled them to
be more easily harnessed as labor under the peaceful control of the church. External
definitions are likely to impose constraints or controls; they will set different conditions
for the reproduction of the group than will internal definition. The most exaggerated
case can be seen in the handling of slaves. The outsider's origin myth for the group will
inevitably differ profoundly from the insider's.
In contrast, insiders' definitions will select features that are presumed to be
advantageous to the members; crucial identifying features, appropriate attendant cultural
markers, and rules about reproduction are defined in terms of how the members see
their own self-interest to be best advanced. Similar1y, the dynamics of social
reproduction are then defined and directed by the operators, and not by others.
Certainly, some major problems in understanding the definitions of both "indio"
and "ladino" hinge on the question of who makes the definition. The term "indio" is
used in many ways, often to refer to people with any degree of darkness of skin, and
sornetime only to those who speak an Indian language. The people being so labeled
could not conceivably keep track of these variable usages and tend not to use the term at
al!.
To some Indians, it may be convenient to c1assify all non-Indians as ladino;
some of these people, however, do not so c1assify themselves. Indeed, the ladinos of
northern Honduras studied by Ghidinelli presented the problem c1early.24The "origin
myth" makes it c1ear that they are descendants of Indians and Europeans, and perhaps
Africans, but their reproductive preference is with whites.
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Historically, an outsiders' definition has often categorized a collectivity that only
later adopts that definition itself. Early colonial "discovery" and ethnographic research
were replete with cases in which a population had one name for itself, specifically
referent to some identifiable set of people, and the western observer had another,
referring to some assemblage that was either more or less inclusive. Thus the term
"indio" of the colonial era had no meaningful referent for the aboriginal peoples. Surely
no one living on the eighteenth-century Atlantic coast called himself or herself a "zambo-
miskito." There are today North Americans who are loath to call themselves "gringos,"
and non-Indian Guatemalans who regard the term "ladino" as denigrating. "Garifuna"
has been substituted for "Black Carib," a term that was a misnomer from the outset.
A1though it took 450 years, the externally applied, universalistic definition of "Indian"
(if not the term itself) established by the Spanish is now increasingly being used as an
internal definition by the Mayan bourgeois members of the population. The fact that
what the Spanish called the "Indian" population is now collectively taking on its own
name is an expression of its own new view of its power.
B. Collective Survival: Politics and the State
Ethnicities that emerge in states are eminentIy political-that is, they are
strategies of social survivaI.25 They are a response to the question of who shall survive
and who shall exercise domination, hegemony, and autonomy in a field of possible
contenders.26 The colonial period of mercantile and industrial state expansion
extinguished or subordinated native and customary practices of peoples in the name,
first, of "progress," and, later, of "development." In contrast today, especially in
ethnocratic states, native and ethnic identifications are a growing source of both
individual security and social action.
In Central America, terms for socially fragmented aggregates, such as
"Pocomam" or "Quiché," are now used as labels for political movements; terms that
were little known outside the groups themselves, such as "Garifuna," are now asserted
to be the correct label for the group in question. For these emerging identity groups, the
state is more often seen to be an obstacle to self-development and to achieving a better
life. While it is possible for people to live in communities where there has been little
opportunity or need for an ethnicity to take form, in contemporary complex societies it is
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common for everyone, in fact, to identify with some ethnicity beyond their immediate
ancestry.
Ethnicities are, then, an expression of solidarity, or of individual identification
with a larger inherited whole, that becomes explicitly recognized and active when
threatened by the state or by processes set in motion by state actions.27 It is almost
inevitable, therefore, that ethnic relationships will, from time to time, be characterized
by conflict and contentiousness,28 particularly when used to seek revindication and
social survival or advancement of their members. They then spawn social movements
and sometimes militancy. Indeed, the only alternative to increasing solidarity is
fragmentation. In earlier, preagricultural eras, and when the natural environment was
les s crowded, it was normal for societies periodically to break-up, and many did so
seasonally. With the crowding of the world, however, the fragmented society is likely
to find its resources expropriated by others and to be unable to recompose itself.
In so-called ethnocracies,29 it is not uncommon for the dominant ethnic group to
claim a kind of nonethnic universality to its own condition and ascribe ethnicity only to
subordinate groups. To ascribe the term solely to some portion of humanity (e.g., to
hold that "Indians" are an ethnicity but that "whites" or "ladinos" are not) places the
discourse in an overtly partisan political context, implying that one is superior to the
other.
The potential for ethnic action within the state is a question of power, which, in
turn, depends on force and control over resources. In Guatemala the basic equation was
established by the conquest, and future generations have been remolded in a procrustean
form established four hundred years ago. Anyone today who is an Indian is subjected to
endless experiences to remind him or her that the relative status of the indigenous
population is still by and large prejudiced and subordinated.
While the conquest established who was at the top and who at the bottom, it did
not establish what might happen between. Clearly, an association with the conquerors
gave advantages, and one with the Indians was disadvantageous. Thus, in the colonial
and early nineteenth-century literature the terms "indio-ladino" and "ladino-Español"
imply that the intermediate populations in question are being prejudiced in one direction
or the other direction. The picture did not begin to clarify until the appearance of the
growing export economy provided an opening in the power structure into which some
members of this amorphous and poorly defined "ladino" population could find a
Census Total Indian Percent
Year Population Population Indian
1950 2,788,122 1,491,725 53.5
1964 4,245,176 1,842,802 43.3
1981 6,054,227 2,536,523 41.9
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footing. The history of the Miskitos and Creoles on the Atlantic coast presents obvious
parallels.
The power implications of imposing names and definitions are manifest in lesser
cases as well as greater. On the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, which the Spanish never
conquered, the indigenous population externally labeled Europeans "Españoles," a
usage that the Nicaraguans have not been able to change in over a hundred years of
independence from Spain.
4. The Future of Ethnic Expansion
While the discussion has been perhaps a liule rambling, there are some
implications to be noted from the material we have covered.
A. There is liule question that the indigenous population of Guatemala is the
most significant on the isthmus. In the late eighteenth century there were some 524,000
Indians in Central America and Pan ama, and some 53 percent of them lived in
Guatemala; today, the figure has risen to 78 percent.
There is a great discrepancy between the estimates of the size of this twentieth-
century population. Proindigenous advocates have claimed that as much as 85 percent of
the population is "Indian," and they would surely be right if everyone with an
indigenous ancestor were included; if, however, we are referring to people who identify
as members of an indigenous ethnicity, then the figure could not hold.
The censuses give some figures that suggest a decelerating decline in the total
population. While the basis of census judgments is notorious, nevertheless, I suspect
that their figures are closer to some kind of social truth than c1aims based on ancestry.






1964 1964 1981 1981
Total Percent Total Percent
Popo Indian Popo Indian
142,873 94.2 204,419 97.1
107,429 93.1 154,249 94.2
263,160 92.0 322,008 89.4
255,280 84.9 328,175 85.2
161,760 76.1 230,059 79.8
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the highest percentage of Indian population manifested an increase in the the proportion
of Indians over the last intercensus periodo This means that in the western highlands
there is a core area where the Indian population is becoming stronger. It seems likely
that the northem part of Quetzaltenango and San Marcos and southem Huehuetenango
are part of this area, were it possible to separate the figures for those areas. It is here that
Carol Smith locates her commercial core of Indian development, and in two of these
departments (El Quiché and Chimaltenango) the greatest loss of Indian life was













While in the overall picture there may be a slow decline in the Indian proportion
of the national population, it is is quite overbalanced by two facts: the rate of decline is






1950-1964 <14vrs) 1964-1981 07 yrs)
53.5 to 43.3 (10.2 pts) 43.3 lo 41.9 (1.4 pts)
27 73
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Of course, population size is not in itself enough to detennine the direction of the
political process. Certainly of equal significance is the fact that the Indian population is
increasingly políticized. Two kinds of processes are relevant here: (1) the fact that the
periods of democratic government-be they ever so brief-have allowed Indians
increasing participation; the 1944-1954 era and the current period have been immensely
important; (2) the fact that the ladino ethnocracy readily resorts to terror to defend itself;
the massacres at Patzicia, Panzos, and the holocaust of the early 1980s have not been
forgotten by either party.
B. The scope of the definition of the indigenous membership is creating a
number of new, perhaps competing, ethnic definitions. When Sol Tax was doing
research in Guatemala in the 1930s and 1940s he proposed that the principal unit of
Indian culture was the municipio. He contested the claims of European ethnographers
that there was any significant larger or more inclusive entity such as tribe or nation.
Today Tax's claim would be seriously challenged, not, however, because he was
wrong, but because times have changed. Many Indians in the early 1950s found their
primary identification with the municipio; employees of the Instituto Indigenista know
the difference between Quiché and Cakchiquel, but the terms were not widely used in all
the villages. Nor was there any general recognition of identification with all the
indigenous people of the country, nation, or region.
Today the importance of the municipio identification is surely changing, but we
have no real knowledge of what is happening there. What is clear is that many Indians
are also finding identity with a larger entity labeled in linguistic tenns-Quiché,
Cakchiquel, Kekchi, Man, Kanjobal, and so on. Equally important is that the Mayan
bourgeoisie is clearly identifying at the nationallevel; possibly for the first time since the
conquest there is a pan-Indian identity. Moreover, this identity is extended by some to
include indigenous peoples of other countries.
There is no question that much of this is experimental; that is, identifications are
proposed and, whether intentionally or not, are sent abroad as trial balloons. If we
remember that the ethnicity is a polítical effort, then it is logical that there should be
various attempts in different forms to find one that will offer individual s security, the
basic reason for their existence.
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C. The search for security is not limited to experiments with forming indigenous
ethnicities. While space precludes any serious treatment here, it is important to place the
ethnic process within the larger context and to recognize that there are others that are
much more visible and active at the moment. These include some that were introduced
during the revolutionary era of 1944-1954 (Le., poli tic al parties, campesino
organizations, labor unions, and the Acción Católica). Clearly the most successful
efforts in recent years have been the new organizational forms offered by the diverse
Protestant groups. Their rather phenomenal increase in the past decade was unpredicted
by any except their own visionaries.
D. Some ethnicities are so small that any serious attempt to keep them a viable
identity is extremely difficult, and one must ask whether it is more an act of artificial
museumship than of a workable survival organization. That is, if ethnicities are survival
vehicles to help people, then one must at least wonder about an ethnicity that is costIy
for people to keep viable. Somehow, the original purpose has been lost; instead of being
a device to help people to survive, it now requires special efforts to keep itself alive. The
Ramas of Nicaragua are a case in point. It is not that the Ramas are making a major
effort to retain their ethnicity; rather, the Nicaraguan government is making the special
effort through hiring linguists to help rekindle interest in the language and to create a
greater identity among the surviving three hundred or four hundred people.
In contrast, Nancie Gonzalez argues that the Garifunas are an ethnicity that is
effectively disintegrating because they are abandoning their native territory along the
Caribbean Coast from Nicaragua to Belize. She notes that they have not, since their
arrival in the late eighteenth century, had much of a polítical structure above that of kin
organization. While she allows that some Garifunas are manifesting a militant nativistic
rhetoric, there is little future for the Garifunas "as a living sociocultural entity." There
are efforts at a revival of Garifuna identity, but it may be as important in advancing
individual careers in the larger society of the United States or Honduras or Belize,30 as it
is aimed at the consolidation of Garifuna society.
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